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DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE
WITH CITIZENS UNITED:
ARE BANS ON CORPORATE
DIRECT CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
STILL CONSTITUTIONAL?
Jason S. Campbell*
Since the early twentieth century, the Tillman Act has barred
corporations from contributing directly to candidates for federal office.
In Citizens United v. FEC, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a related
ban that prevented corporations from making independent expenditures
in candidate elections. The legal foundation of the independent
expenditure ban was similar to that which still supports the corporate
direct contributions ban, thus calling into question the continuing
validity of the direct contributions ban. This Note argues that if the
Court follows the logical path that it laid down in Citizens United, it
should overturn the corporate direct contributions ban.

* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; A.B. Georgetown University. I
thank Professor Rick Hasen for inspiring this Note, Associate Professor Justin Levitt for his time
and incomparable guidance, and the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
for their hard work and dedication.
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“Of what avail would a law be to prohibit the contributing
direct to a candidate and yet permit the expenditure of large
sums in his behalf?”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In his first State of the Union address to Congress, President
Barack Obama may have broken a bit of protocol. In a direct and
public tussle with the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court sitting just
feet away, President Obama said, “With all due deference to
separation of powers, last week the Supreme Court reversed a
century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special
interests . . . to spend without limit in our elections.”2 The line was as
powerful as it was controversial: although Citizens United v. FEC3
does declare unconstitutional a federal ban on corporate independent
expenditures on behalf of candidates in elections,4 the prohibition
had only been in place since the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act.5 Further, only in
1976’s landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo6 did the Supreme Court
first encounter independent expenditures by persons,7 and only in
1990 did the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce8
uphold a ban on specifically corporate independent expenditures.9
What President Obama was likely referring to in his mention to
a century of law, and what this Note will focus on, is corporate direct
campaign contributions to candidates in federal elections. A ban on
such contributions has been in place for more than a century—since

1. United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 581 (1957) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 79-2739, at 40 (1947)).
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address
(Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-state-union-address).
3. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
4. Id. at 917.
5. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2006)).
6. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
7. Id. at 7.
8. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
9. Id. at 655.
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1907’s Tillman Act10—and Citizens United does not reach the
question of the constitutionality of the ban. The reasoning that
Justice Kennedy used in his majority opinion, however, has raised
the specter that the bans, long upheld as constitutional, are now at
least constitutionally suspect.11 Indeed, as this Note argues, if a
challenge to the ban reaches the Supreme Court as the Court is
currently composed, it is likely the Court will declare
unconstitutional bans on corporate direct campaign contributions to
candidates.
Such a challenge in the Supreme Court may not be too far off:
statewide bans in Iowa12 and Minnesota13 and a municipal ban in San
Diego14 have faced challenges in those jurisdictions,15 and while
district courts have so far inconsistently extended Citizens United’s
holding to contribution bans,16 appellate courts have continued to
uphold the bans because the Court’s decision upholding the ban in
FEC v. Beaumont is still “good law” unless and until the Court
overrules it.17
Part II of this Note will briefly outline the origins of the ban on
corporate direct campaign contributions. Part III will analyze how
the Court historically has dealt with each step of the constitutional
question the federal direct contributions ban implicates, and how
Citizens United vastly alters the Court’s analytical framework. Part
IV will look at the corporate direct contribution ban through the

10. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)
(2006)).
11. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching a Leaking Dam?: Corporate Money and Elections,
4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 91, 139 (2009) (stating that Citizens United’s overruling of Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce might foreshadow the unconstitutionality of the contribution
ban).
12. Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, No. 4:10-cv-416 RP-TJS, 2011 WL 2649980
(S.D. Iowa June 29, 2011) (upholding the ban).
13. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304 (8th Cir. 2011)
(upholding the ban).
14. Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding the ban).
15. E.g., United States v. Danielczyk, No. 1:11cr85 (JCC), 2011 WL 2268063, at *6 (E.D.
Va. June 7, 2011) (declaring the ban unconstitutional). Danielczyk is currently on appeal to the
Fourth Circuit.
16. E.g., Tooker, 2011 WL 2649980, at *10 (finding constitutional the ban on corporate
direct campaign contributions); Danielczyk, 2011 WL 2268063, at *6 (declaring the ban
unconstitutional).
17. Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189,
199 (2d Cir. 2010)).
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Citizens United frame and argue that the ban is no longer
constitutional.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE
BAN ON CORPORATE
DIRECT CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
The history of bans on corporate direct campaign contributions
runs deep in both the state and federal levels of government. This
Part looks into the origins of the federal ban, which began with the
Tillman Act in 1907.18 Since similar state bans will remain or fall on
the same logic as the federal ban, for clarity this Note will focus on
the federal ban only.
Congress passed and President Theodore Roosevelt signed the
Tillman Act at the height of the progressive era in 1907.19 The
legislation’s precise purpose is the subject of a fair amount of
disagreement,20 and, as discussed later, the two main positions that
emerged both found homes in the Court’s campaign finance
jurisprudence. The first is that the Tillman Act’s primary purpose
was to protect the political process from the real or perceived
corruption caused by the undue influence that resulted from
corporate financial contributions.21 Corporate involvement in
elections, while a well-known fact in political circles, was considered
to be illegitimate and so was deliberately hidden.22 The second
position is that Congress passed the Tillman Act because of its
concern that “company executives were opportunistically
18. In 1891 Kentucky passed the first statewide ban on corporate campaign contributions.
Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance
Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 883 (2004). In 1897 Nebraska, Tennessee, Missouri, and Florida also
passed bans. Melvin I. Urofsky, Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV.
1, 13 (2008). Since that time states and municipalities have passed their own bans on corporate
direct contributions. Today, twenty-three states have bans in effect. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES (Jan. 20, 2010),
available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/limits_candidates.pdf. California
is not among them.
19. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)
(2006)).
20. E.g., Winkler, supra note 18, at 880–81 (disagreeing with prevailing scholarly
interpretation of the purpose of the Tillman Act).
21. ANN B. MATASAR, CORPORATE PACS AND FEDERAL CAMPAIGN LAWS: USE OR ABUSE
OF POWER? 8 (1986); see EDWIN M. EPSTEIN, CORPORATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND POLITICAL
CAMPAIGNS: FEDERAL REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 12 (1968).
22. ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 1–2 (1988).
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misappropriating [shareholders’] money”23 without permission—in
other words, the legislation aimed to prevent company management
from using the corporate treasury to influence elections without
shareholder approval.24 Each came to the fore in the corporate and
political scandals of the early twentieth century.25
Expenses for and corporate involvement in presidential elections
grew steadily, beginning with Abraham Lincoln’s 1860 campaign
and continuing through Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 campaign.26
Lincoln’s campaign cost his supporters some $100,000 (at least $2
million today),27 and corporations became a part of campaign
financing during the Civil War.28 In 1864 Lincoln wrote that
corporations had become enthroned as a result of the war, “and an
era of corruption in high places will follow. The money power of the
country will endeavor to prolong its rule by preying upon the
prejudices of the people until all wealth is concentrated in a few
hands and the Republic is destroyed.”29
If corporations had become a source of campaign funding in the
1860s, by the mid-1880s they had become the principal source.30
Some corporations then began making donations of $50,000 or more
to the national party committees.31 A Republican Party boss
institutionalized corporate giving in the ensuing decade,32 and by
1896 William McKinley raised and spent as much as $7 million
(almost $140 million today) for his presidential campaign.33 Still, an
organized movement calling for campaign finance reform did not
23. Winkler, supra note 18, at 873.
24. MATASAR, supra note 21, at 8.
25. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 18, at 887–900 (discussing how the nation’s three largest
insurance companies used “other people’s money” to influence the political process in the years
preceding the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907).
26. Urofsky, supra note 18, at 7–12.
27. Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens’ Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First
Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (1997).
28. Urofsky, supra note 18, at 7.
29. Id. (quoting JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM, THE MONEY MEN: THE REAL STORY OF
FUNDRAISING’S INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 26 (2000)).
30. See Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance
Law, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 7, 10 (2005).
31. Id.; see also BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM 21 (2001) (listing examples of corporate contributions).
32. See Corrado, supra note 30, at 10.
33. Smith, supra note 27, at 10.
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emerge until after Roosevelt’s 1904 election and the Great Wall
Street Scandal of 1905.34
The Great Wall Street Scandal was the great corporate scandal
of its day.35 The New York State Legislature had begun an
investigation into the alleged self-dealing of insurance company
executives.36 The stories of company-paid opulent parties and other
exploits that emerged filled the tabloids, and soon the “whole
country was in a state of hysteria over [the] insurance matters.”37 The
investigation then revealed that several major companies had given
large contributions to the Republican campaign, including $48,000
(more than $1 million today) from New York Life to Roosevelt’s
reelection fund.38 In an era in which it was customary to burn records
of campaign contributions,39 the revelation caused a nationwide,
front-page sensation “as it furnished the first tangible evidence of
connections between the insurance company and a political party.”40
Subsequent inquiry revealed that 72.5 percent of Roosevelt’s
campaign funding came from corporations.41
Roosevelt quickly reacted to the New York Life disclosure, and
his 1905 call for a ban on corporate contributions is regarded as
creating the forward momentum that was needed for Congress to
pass the ban on corporate contributions.42 Roosevelt’s 1905 State of
the Union address set forth the two main rationales behind the
Tillman Act.43 The President said,
All contributions by corporations to any political committee
or for any political purpose should be forbidden by law;
directors should not be permitted to use stockholders’
money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of
34.
35.
36.
37.

Corrado, supra note 30, at 10; Winkler, supra note 18, at 887.
Winkler, supra note 18, at 887.
Id. at 887–88.
Id. at 888 (quoting MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE
POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 67–68 (1994)).
38. Id. at 891–92. The contribution launched more than simply a scandal, but its uncovering
made a hero out of investigator Charles Evans Hughes, transforming him from a “scarcely
known” and “mediocre corporate lawyer . . . to Governor of New York in just a year.” Id. at 889–
90. Hughes later became Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.
39. HENRY F. PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: A BIOGRAPHY 356 (1987).
40. MUTCH, supra note 22, at 2 (quoting N.Y. TRIB., Sept. 16, 1905, at 1).
41. PRINGLE, supra note 39, at 357.
42. See MUTCH, supra note 22, at 4.
43. Urofsky, supra note 18, at 15–16.
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this kind would be, as far as it went, an effective method of
stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts.44
The Tillman Act ban on corporate contributions thus became
“merely the first concrete manifestation of a continuing
congressional concern for elections ‘free from the power of
[corporate] money.’”45
The insurance company campaign finance scandals and the
resultant public sentiment in favor of reform propelled the Tillman
Act forward.46 The scandal distilled two main concerns about
corporate involvement in elections: corruption and the ultra vires
appropriation of shareholder wealth. The worry over corruption
included the concern that congressional representatives had become
the “instrumentalities and agents of the corporations” from which
they raised campaign funding.47 Under this view, the underlying
basis for the Tillman Act’s passage was a move to prevent the
subversion, or corruption, of the political process in which corporate
donations were considered illegitimate.48
The other hypothesis of the Tillman Act’s origins rests in agency
theory.49 According to Professor Adam Winkler, concern about
excessive corporate involvement in elections was in fact
“overshadowed by a different conception of corporate political
corruption.”50 After the New York Life scandal, the public became
outraged that insurance company executives had given company
money without approval to influence political campaigns.51 That
44. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905)).
45. United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957) (quoting Hearing for
H. Comm. on Elections, 59th Cong. 12 (1906) (statement of Samuel Gompers, President, Am.
Fed’n of Labor)).
46. Corrado, supra note 30, at 12. Edwin Epstein placed the Tillman Act’s motivational
origins in the 1890s, when President Benjamin Harrison’s cabinet was known as the
Businessman’s Cabinet and the U.S. Senate was known as The Millionaire’s Club. EPSTEIN,
supra note 21, at 1–2.
47. Smith, supra note 27, at 24; see MUTCH, supra note 22, at 6 (quoting the Tillman Act’s
sponsor). Many were also concerned that corporations were bribing voters to support a given
candidate. See Corrado, supra note 30, at 11 (“[The law] should include severe penalties against
him who gives or receives a bribe intended to influence his act or opinion as an elector . . . .”
(quoting Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Dec. 6, 1904) (transcript available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29545#axzz1dRYNtK5h))).
48. Winkler, supra note 18, at 893.
49. See id. at 873.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 887.
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money belonged to the company or, more specifically, to the
policyholders who were considered to be the company owners.52
Democrats picked up on the theme, and in legislative floor debate
they emphasized the agency-costs theme repeatedly.53 Under this
view, Congress passed the Tillman Act to protect the owners of
companies—shareholders or policyholders—from the use of their
money against their will for political purposes. Both this shareholderprotection theory and the corruption-based theory have lived on in
Court jurisprudence on the issue.
Both the anticorruption theory and the shareholder-protection
theory emerged as two of the compelling government interests that
the Court has recognized when it has considered the constitutionality
of bans on corporate donations and similar regulations concerning
corporate involvement in political funding.54 Following the wellworn framework for analyzing the constitutionality of a statute, the
next Part will consider the Court’s jurisprudence at each analytical
step. Although the concerns that propelled the Tillman Act into the
United States Code are more than a century old, they and others
remain hotly contested.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
FOR THE CORPORATE DIRECT
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION BAN
In Citizens United, the Court followed the basic judicial review
template: define the right, determine whether the right is burdened,
and weigh the government interest against the burden using the
appropriate level of scrutiny.55 The Court did, however,
fundamentally alter the options available at each level of the
analysis, and this Part will detail those alterations. As will be
discussed below, the right at issue in campaign contribution cases is
52. Id.
53. Id. at 923.
54. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003) (“[N]ot only has the original ban
on direct corporate contributions endured, but so have the original rationales for the law. In
barring corporate [donations,] . . . the ban was and is intended to ‘preven[t] corruption or the
appearance of corruption.’” (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985))); FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (“[The
ban protects shareholders] from having th[eir] money used to support political candidates to
whom they may be opposed.”).
55. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 896–98 (2010).
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the right of association.56 Citizens United strongly suggests that
corporations have a right to associate that is analogous to that which
individuals enjoy. Citizens United further suggests that the Court
views bans on certain kinds of political funding with increasing
skepticism, and therefore it will find the right of association
extremely burdened by the corporate contribution ban. Finally,
Citizens United significantly narrows the government interests that
the Court finds important enough to warrant the burden on First
Amendment rights. If the Court is willing to follow Citizens United’s
logical extensions, the Court should find the corporate contribution
ban unconstitutional.
A. A Corporate Right to Associate?
When the issue before the Court involves campaign finance, the
1976 decision of Buckley v. Valeo57 is the prism through which the
Court looks. The Buckley Court considered the constitutionality of
the 1974 amendments58 to the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971.59 The Court considered, among other things, individual limits
on both campaign contributions to candidates and independent
expenditures, upholding the former60 and striking down the latter.61
The distinction, the Court reasoned, was that while independentexpenditure limits place a “more severe”62 restriction on “political
expression ‘at the core of . . . First Amendment freedoms,’”63 caps on
contributions to candidates “entail[] only a marginal restriction upon
the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”64 More
specifically, the contribution limitation’s primary effect was to
restrict “one aspect of the contributor’s freedom of political
association.”65 This is so because contributing is a symbolic act of

56.
57.
58.
1263.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam).
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29.
Id. at 143–44.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 24–25 (emphasis added).
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associating one’s self with the speech of a candidate.66 Moreover,
giving a candidate a contribution leaves the contributor otherwise
free to exercise her freedom of speech by discussing candidates and
issues.67 This Part will look at the nature of the freedom to associate
and its relation to the express rights of speech and assembly in the
First Amendment of the Constitution, and it will conclude that the
corporations now have a strong claim to freedom of association
themselves.68
Although the freedom of association is not expressly mentioned
in the First Amendment to the Constitution,69 the Court has
acknowledged that the First Amendment supports such a freedom in
two distinct senses.70 In one sense, choices to associate in certain
intimate human relationships like marriages are secured against
undue government intrusion because of the role that such
relationships play in safeguarding individual freedom.71 This sense of
association is protected as a fundamental liberty by the Fourteenth
Amendment under the doctrine of substantive due process72 and is
not the focus of this Part. In the other sense, the right to associate as
an instrument for exercising First Amendment rights like speech is
protected73 and is therefore derived from those rights. The freedom of
association exists in this context within the “close nexus” between
the freedoms of speech and assembly.74 There the freedom to
associate functions to preserve the exercise of those rights,75 but it is
66. Id. at 21.
67. Id.
68. To be clear, in considering whether a corporation has a right to associate that is
analogous to the individual right, the right for individuals to associate as a corporation is not at
issue. Rather, the issue is whether a corporation itself has a right to associate itself with a
candidate for political office.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”).
70. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984).
71. Id. at 617–18.
72. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978) (holding that marriage is
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment because “[i]t is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.”).
73. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
74. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
75. SHELDON LEADER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN LABOR LAW AND
POLITICAL THEORY 22 (1992).
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no less fundamental simply for being derived from them.76 This sense
of the freedom is the focus of this Part.
For individuals, it is easy to see how the freedom of association
is a necessary derivative of the other rights in the First Amendment.
It is simply the avenue by which individuals exercise collectively
their individually held First Amendment rights.77 Collective exercise
is protected because if the government “forbid[s] two or more people
from banding together to express a point of view, [it] may have
effectively forbidden them singly to express that point of view.”78 In
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley79 Chief Justice
Burger briefly described why it is so essential to protect political
association:
[T]he practice of persons sharing common views banding
together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in
the American political process. The 18th-century
Committees of Correspondence and the pamphleteers were
early examples of this phenomena and the Federalist Papers
were perhaps the most significant and lasting example. The
tradition of volunteer committees for collective action has
manifested itself in myriad community and public
activities; in the political process it can focus on a candidate
or on a ballot measure. Its value is that by collective effort
individuals can make their views known, when,
individually, their voices would be faint or lost.80
Notwithstanding this importance, because the freedom to
associate is derived from other First Amendment rights, its contours
cannot be broader than those of its source rights.81 It is necessary,
then, to determine the scope of a corporation’s right to freedom of
speech, and only then to consider whether a corporation has the
derivative right to associate.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
LEADER, supra note 75, at 22.
Id.
454 U.S. 290 (1981).
Id. at 294.
LEADER, supra note 75, at 23.
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1. The Source of the Corporate
Freedom of Association
The corporate right to the freedom of speech is defined by two
animating concepts. First, in general the freedom of speech is
protected because of the interests of two parties: the speaker and the
listener.82 The second concept is more of an open question as to
whether, when a corporation is speaking,83 the expression is that of
the corporation as an entity apart from its shareholders, or whether
the expression represents the collective voice of those shareholders.
The distinction between speaker and listener interests is
particularly important in the context of corporate speech. For the
individual speaker, the freedom of speech protects fundamental
aspects of personhood,84 including self-expression and selfrealization.85 For individual speakers, “[t]he First Amendment serves
not only the needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit—a
spirit that demands self-expression.”86
The Court has recognized something of a need for expression in
corporations, but the need is far more circumscribed than the
personal self-expression need.87 Under the commercial speech
doctrine, commercial speech is that which is “closely related to
effecting commercial transactions . . . and/or speech whose
occurrence and content are motivated largely by the speaker’s
economic interests.”88 The early rationale for protecting corporate
speech in the form of retail advertising was to enable consumers to
make better commercial decisions,89 and thus it was consumers’ need

82. Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected
Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1229, 1233
(1991).
83. A corporation cannot, of course, speak. This Note will nonetheless engage in the fiction
that messages transmitted on behalf of a corporation represent the corporation speaking.
84. Dan-Cohen, supra note 82, at 1232–33.
85. Id. at 1233; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 32
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“This Court has recognized that natural persons enjoy negative
free speech rights because of their interest in self-expression . . . .”).
86. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
87. See Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in NonCommercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379, 386 (2006) (recognizing that the First Amendment
protects commercial expression, though less so than it protects noncommercial expression).
88. Id. at 388–89.
89. See id. at 389 (“The principal rationale given for protecting commercial speech is the
interests of consumers and of society in general in ‘the free flow of commercial information.’”
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for information that was burdened by restrictions on corporate
speech. Later cases, however, emphasized the burden that regulation
placed on corporate retailers themselves, and the cases paid only lip
service to any burden on the consumer.90 In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly,91 the Court spoke specifically of the burden on a tobacco
retailer in terms of the corporate retailer’s need to convey
information about its product.92 Insofar as commercial speech is
concerned, if corporations have an interest or need in expression, it is
only to the extent that the expression is tied to the corporation’s
economic interests. In other words, corporations can advertise their
business in the hopes of transacting business.93
Apart from the commercial speech doctrine, the freedom of
speech protects the listener’s right to hear political speech, but the
speech itself is protected for the listener’s sake—not, in this case, for
the corporate speaker’s sake.94 Meir Dan-Cohen created a useful
example to illustrate the point:
A right may be recognized in A out of [a self-expression
and self-realization] concern for A himself. In such a case,
A has . . . an original right. A right in A may also result
from a concern not for him but for B[’s need to hear the
speech]. In this case, A will be said to have a derivative
right.95
This derivative right is also passive, since in this context A’s interest
is not in speaking, which is an active right, but in A’s not being
interrupted so that B has the opportunity to hear him.96 We are left
with two classes of rights that the freedom of speech protects: the
active original right and the passive derivative right.97

(citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763–64
(1976))).
90. Id. at 391.
91. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
92. Id. at 564.
93. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (“A quarter of a
century ago, the Court held that commercial speech, usually defined as speech that does no more
than propose a commercial transaction, is protected by the First Amendment.”).
94. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 82, at 1245.
95. Id. at 1233.
96. Id. at 1234.
97. Id. at 1234, 1244.
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Because corporations do not share the natural person’s need for
self-expression98 beyond their economic interest, or, as former Chief
Justice Rehnquist more broadly termed it, the need for freedom of
conscience,99 it follows that, before Citizens United, corporations as
entities apart from their shareholders did not have an original right to
freedom of speech in the political context. Political speech, though
difficult to define precisely, is surely self-expressive.100 However,
corporate speech in the political context is important because it
increases the “stock of information from which . . . the public may
draw.”101 As described more fully below, corporate political speech
before Citizens United therefore fit within the First Amendment’s
protection because the Court viewed it as a passive derivative right—
derivative because it was based on the public’s right to listen, and
passive because it was based on the public’s right to hear, not the
corporation’s right to speak.102
2. Corporate Speech and Association
Rights Before Citizens United
The Supreme Court adopted for corporate political speech the
passive derivative model described above103 in 1978’s First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.104 First National Bank challenged the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts state law that prohibited business
corporations from making contributions or expenditures to influence
the outcome of a ballot measure.105 In characterizing the right at
98. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804–05 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting) (“Indeed, what some have considered to be the principal function of the First
Amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization, and selffulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech.”).
99. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 32 (1986) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
100. See Erwin Chemerinsky, How Will Morse v. Frederick Be Applied?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 17, 23 (2008) (“Professor Baker said: ‘[t]o engage voluntarily in a speech act is to engage
in self-definition [and] expression. A Vietnam war protestor may explain that when she chants
“Stop This War Now” at a demonstration, she does so without any expectation that her speech
will affect continuance of the war . . .; rather, she participates and chants in order to define herself
publicly in opposition to the war.’” (quoting C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 994 (1978))).
101. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783.
102. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 82, at 1245.
103. Id.
104. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
105. Id. at 768 n.2.
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issue, the Court dismissed the subject of corporate First Amendment
rights106 by stating that the questions were not whether corporations
have First Amendment rights and whether those rights are
coextensive with individuals’ rights.107 The Court asked instead
whether Massachusetts’s law abridged expression that the First
Amendment protected,108 thus focusing on the speech itself rather
than on the speaker.109 The Court held that the law did so abridge
protected expression not because the corporation had a right to
freedom of speech that was analogous to the personal right, but
because of the First Amendment interest in “affording the public
access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information
and ideas.”110 Thus, Bellotti rested not on the basis of any rights or
interests of the corporation itself111 but on “protecting the
constitutional rights of people”112 to receive the information the
speech conveys. The Court was very careful never to say that it was
protecting a corporation’s active right to speak.
The Court gave perhaps its clearest endorsement of the view that
the corporate speech right is less fundamental in 1990’s Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce.113 There the Court upheld as
constitutional a ban on corporate independent expenditures on behalf
of candidates in federal election campaigns.114 In contrast, the
Buckley Court held that such expenditures by individuals could not
be limited because they were a “severe restriction[]” on protected
freedoms.115
Returning to the premise that the right to associate is itself
derivative of the freedom of speech, it becomes difficult to discern
whether in the pre-Citizens United era corporations had the right to
106. Robert E. Mutch, Before and After Bellotti: The Corporate Political Contributions
Cases, 5 ELECTION L.J. 293, 310 (2006).
107. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776; see also Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights
of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 870 (2007) (“Bellotti . . . is of potentially
limited significance when it comes to corporate political speech rights.”).
108. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
109. JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 187 (2003).
110. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783.
111. Bennigson, supra note 87, at 399.
112. Id.
113. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
114. Id. at 655.
115. Buckley v. Valeo, 435 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
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associate politically. Before Citizens United, business corporations
had a direct right to speak, as the commercial speech doctrine
recognized;116 political speech, however, was protected only insofar
as it was necessary to protect the right of people to hear the corporate
message.117 While it may be said that collective association enhances
listeners’ rights, the Court never held that corporations had the right
of political association. It is therefore unclear whether a corporate
right to associate existed in an era when the Court conceived of
corporate rights as derivative.118
3. Corporate Speech and Association
Rights After Citizens United
The Citizens United decision fundamentally recasts the nature of
a corporate right to speak,119 taking it much closer to the original
right discussed above. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion jettisoned
the carefully circumscribed language of Bellotti in favor of language
that significantly broadened both the question presented and the
answer that followed. As a result, the post-Citizens United argument
for a corporate right to associate in the form of direct campaign
contributions to candidates became much stronger, if not
unassailable.
In the first sentence of the section in which it explicated the
corporate speech right, the Citizens United majority cited no fewer
than twenty-one Supreme Court decisions spanning fifty years of
jurisprudence for the proposition that “[t]he Court has recognized
that First Amendment protection extends to corporations.”120 The
116. See Bennigson, supra note 87.
117. Id. at 423–24.
118. Nevertheless, in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of
California, the Court recognized at least a corporate right not to be forced to associate. 475 U.S.
1, 12–17 (1986). The Commission required Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (PG&E) to allow a
utility ratepayer’s advocacy group to enclose insertions in PG&E’s billing envelopes. Id. at 4.
Chief Justice Burger likened this to forcing PG&E to print the messages of others on its utility
trucks and other property. Id. at 21 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Powell, writing for the
majority as he had in Bellotti, wrote that such forced associations were impermissible, even for
corporations. Id. at 15. A right not to be forced to do something, however, does not create or
imply a right to do the thing. Pacific Gas therefore does not show that corporations, before
Citizens United, had the right to associate with candidates via contributions.
119. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 958 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The only thing about Bellotti that could not be clearer is that it declined
to adopt the majority’s position.”).
120. Id. at 899 (majority opinion).
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seeming consistency of fifty years, however, was later undermined
when the Court acknowledged that “[o]ur Nation’s speech dynamic
is changing . . . .”121 Its discussion of Bellotti plainly shows the
change.
The Court put broad and inexact language to work in the service
of making it seem as though its decision merely returned to and
reapplied the sound principles that it had announced in Bellotti.122
The Court first made it clear that in no context could the government
distinguish the First Amendment rights of corporations from those of
individuals.123 It then referenced Bellotti, unqualifiedly stating that
the “central principle” of Bellotti was “that the First Amendment
does not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s
corporate identity.”124 Bellotti, however, expressly circumscribed its
own holding by indicating that the speech protection that it found
was contextually limited.125 Nowhere in the Citizens United opinion
did the majority offer a similar limiting principle on its holding. The
closest that the Court came to recognizing such a principle was in
passively noting that corporate contribution limits have been an
accepted means of preventing quid pro quo corruption, and that the
petitioners had not suggested that the Court reconsider this
position.126 Thus, while the Court took great pains to make clear
Citizens United’s logical commonalities with Bellotti, its holding in
Citizens United was far broader.
The Court further departed from Bellotti by repeatedly equating
the corporate speaker to the individual human speaker.127 It held that,
as opposed to merely recognizing protection of a corporation’s right
to speak because of listeners’ rights, “[t]he Court has . . . rejected the
argument that political speech of corporations . . . should be treated
differently under the First Amendment simply because such
121. Id. at 912.
122. See id. at 913 (“We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti . . . .”).
123. See id. at 900.
124. Id. at 903.
125. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (“[O]ur
consideration of a corporation’s right to speak on issues of general public interest implies no
comparable right in the quite different context of participation in a political campaign for election
to public office.”); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 958 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (discussing the “explicit limitation” on the scope of the Bellotti holding).
126. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
127. See id. at 884, 900, 912, 929.

Fall 2011]

DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE

189

associations are not ‘natural persons.’”128 Adding to this clear
equivalence of corporate speech rights and individual speech rights,
the Court noted that corporations “have the need or the motive to
communicate their views.”129 Although the Court recognized the role
of listener rights, it recognized that corporations have the need for
self-expression and self-realization—one of the primary rationales
that underlies the personal freedom of speech—and thus that
corporations have an original speech right.130 This explains how the
Court held that, in the context of political speech, the First
Amendment does not permit Congress to make categorical
distinctions based on whether the speaker is a corporation or an
individual.131
Another way to say that the First Amendment allows for no
categorical distinctions between corporations and individuals is to
say that corporations and individuals enjoy a right that is
coextensive. Individuals, as discussed above, have an original right
to speech, meaning that they have a right to self-expression for their
own sake completely apart from any concern for the listener or for
increasing the information that is available to the public. Bellotti and
later holdings acknowledged a distinction between corporations and
individuals on the basis that corporate speech rights were derivative,
not original, and the Court thus carefully limited those decisions in
the context of political speech from categorically equating a
corporation with a person. Because it recognizes corporate original
speech rights, the Citizens United opinion finds any distinction
repugnant in the context of political expression.
This has direct implications for the corporate contributions ban
because the recognition of corporate original speech rights bolsters a
corporate claim to the freedom of association. If political speech
rights for corporations are tied to the corporation as an entity, as
Citizens United strongly implies they are, then corporate political
expression would “undeniably [be] enhanced by group
association.”132 Citizens United is therefore where the corporate
128. Id. at 900 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776).
129. Id. at 906.
130. See id. at 906–08.
131. Id. at 913.
132. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) (quoting
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).

190

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:171

rubber meets the freedom-of-association road. This has direct
implications for the corporate direct contribution ban because, with
the full protection of a corporate original speech right in hand,
corporations now may invoke their right of political association in
order to make direct contributions to political candidates.
B. Alternative Means for Expression
and the Burden That Bans Place on
Corporate Association Rights
Finding that corporations have a right to political association
does not require a finding that any regulation that implicates the right
is unconstitutional.133 Instead, the given regulation must also burden
the right.134 The Court has gone so far as to say that even a significant
burden that contribution regulations place on association rights may
be sustained.135
Beginning with Buckley in 1976, the Court set out a relatively
unworried view of the burden that contribution limits place on
associational rights. The Buckley Court considered individual
campaign contribution limits that Congress had enacted in the early
1970s.136 The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) limited
individual contributions to $1,000 per candidate.137 The Court set out
its analysis by noting that the primary problem that contribution
limits raise is their restriction on one aspect of a contributor’s
association right, as described above.138 The Court then noted that
even if the contributions limit affected this “narrow aspect” of
political association, individuals remained free to engage in
independent political expression, to volunteer their services to
political campaigns, and to assist campaigns with the limited
donation that FECA permitted.139 The limitations therefore failed to

133. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“[N]either the right to associate
nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute . . . .” (quoting U.S. Civil Serv.
Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973))).
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 6.
137. Id. at 7.
138. Id. at 24–25.
139. See id. at 28–29.
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undermine “to any material degree” the individual’s rights at issue,
and the Court upheld the limits.140
Since a corporation cannot physically volunteer for a candidate,
Congress created the political action committee (PAC) option as an
alternative means for corporate expression.141 A PAC is a separate,
segregated fund that a corporation forms to raise and spend money to
get candidates elected.142 Each PAC is distinct from its corporate
parent, and shareholders may donate funds to support the PAC’s
political activities.143 Each PAC must be registered with the Federal
Elections Commission (FEC), appoint a treasurer, keep for three
years records of receipts and disbursements, and file financial reports
disclosing its contributors and their contributions.144 The FEC
regulates in some form almost all aspects of PAC activity.145
In 2003 the Court addressed the current federal ban on corporate
contributions in one of four cases that one scholar deemed the “New
Deference Quartet.”146 FEC v. Beaumont147 and the other Quartet
members marked the Court’s very deferential approach to legislative
determinations on the need for campaign finance regulation.148 The
Court in Beaumont confronted a split among the circuit courts of
appeals as to the constitutionality of the Tillman Act149 as applied to
to nonprofit advocacy corporations.150 A political advocacy
corporation funded by individual member contributions mounted an
140. Id. at 29.
141. See FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1982).
142. THOMAS GAIS, IMPROPER INFLUENCE: CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW, POLITICAL INTEREST
GROUPS, AND THE PROBLEM OF EQUALITY 5 (1996).
143. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887–88 (2010) (discussing 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(2) (2006)); see also Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 204–06 (upholding the
requirement that funds come only from shareholders and union members).
144. See generally FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CAMPAIGN GUIDE FOR CORPORATIONS AND
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/colagui.pdf (explaining
the rules each PAC must follow).
145. See generally id. (describing the various regulations PACs must follow).
146. See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign
Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 67–
68 (2004).
147. 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
148. See generally Hasen, supra note 146 (discussing how two cases within the Quartet,
McConnell and Beaumont, were overturned or significantly undermined by Citizens United).
149. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 150.
150. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006) (“It is unlawful for any . . . corporation whatever, or any
labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election . . . .”).
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as-applied challenge to the ban.151 Justice Souter, writing for the sixmember majority,152 hardly addressed and all but dismissed whether a
contribution ban burdened the freedom of association.153 The Court
considered contribution restrictions, a phrase that it broadly defined
to include the ban, as “closer to the edges than to the core of political
expression.”154 Further, the Court saw a corporation’s option of
channeling contributions through a PAC as ameliorating any concern
about the burden on associational rights.155 As such, any burden on or
interference with the plaintiff corporation’s associational right, if
any, was cause for little concern.156
Beaumont viewed the ban on corporate direct campaign
contributions in two contexts—the broader regulatory scheme on the
one hand,157 and the relationship between a corporation and its PAC
on the other.158 As to the broader regulatory scheme, Justice Souter
situated the contributions ban within the “careful legislative
adjustment of the federal electoral laws.”159 More important,
however, the Court emphasized that the associative burden was on
the shareholders, not on the corporation itself.160 Although the
corporate plaintiff argued that the regulation in question was a
complete ban on the corporation’s ability to donate to candidates,161
the Court disagreed and held that the PAC option did not
“jeopardiz[e] the associational rights of [shareholders].”162 The focus
on the shareholders, rather than on the corporation itself, reflected
Justice Souter’s view that corporate speech rights are derivative—not
only in the sense described above with respect to listener rights, but
also in the sense that a speaking corporation is really the sum of its

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 151.
Justice Kennedy concurred only in the judgment.
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161–62.
Id. at 161.
See id. at 162–63.
Id. at 162.
See id. at 152–56.
See id. at 156–59.
Id. at 153 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982)).
Id. at 162–63.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 163.
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shareholders.163 The prohibition on corporate contributions therefore
amounted to a ban in name only, since the PAC option still allowed
shareholder participation in federal elections.
In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life164 (WRTL II), however, the
Court shifted on the issue of the rights in question and on its view of
whether the PAC option alleviated the burden on that right.165 Chief
Justice Roberts wrote in WRTL II’s plurality opinion that Justice
Souter’s “dissent overstates its case when it asserts that the ‘PAC
alternative’ gives corporations a constitutionally sufficient outlet to
speak.”166 Instead, “PACs impose well-documented and onerous
burdens, particularly on small nonprofits.”167 Thus, in Chief Justice
Roberts’s view, the burden was on the corporation itself, not on the
shareholders.
Later, in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy cemented this shift.
Justice Kennedy, who had dissented in part in McConnell v. FEC168
and there likened PACs to “compulsory ventriloquism,”169 now wrote
for an outright majority of the Court. The Court described PACs as
burdensome alternatives that failed to alleviate the burden that an
independent expenditure ban placed on the First Amendment.170
Thus, the Citizens United Court focused on the corporation itself,
holding that the PAC option “does not allow corporations to
speak.”171 This shift on whose right is being burdened tracks the
broader move from viewing corporate speech rights as derivative to
viewing corporate speech rights as original. Where a corporate right
is derived from those of shareholders and listeners, as in Beaumont
and Bellotti, the focus necessarily is on them; on the other hand,
when the corporation itself has the original right, as in Citizens
United, the focus necessarily is on the corporation.
163. See id. (“The PAC option allows corporate political participation without . . .
jeopardizing the association[] rights of advocacy organizations’ members.”).
164. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
165. Id. at 532.
166. Id. at 536 n.9. Although only Justice Alito joined Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion, their
position between the opinions of Justice Souter and Justice Scalia made decisive the Chief
Justice’s opinion. Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory
Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1079 (2008).
167. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 536 n.9.
168. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
169. Id. at 333 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010).
171. Id.
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The shift of focus to the rights of the corporation will change the
calculus if and when the Court again confronts the corporate direct
contribution ban. While in Beaumont and the other New Deference
Quartet cases a PAC option satisfied the Court that shareholders’
associative rights were adequately protected, now it is likely that the
PAC option is inadequate because the law forcing corporations to
channel donations through PACs prevents the corporation itself from
donating to candidates. It is simply not enough that shareholders can
donate, and thus express themselves, via the PAC. The burden placed
on the right is not alleviated.
C. Citizens United Discards Many of the
Government Interests That Have Supported
and Could Continue to Support the Ban
Thus far this Note shown how the logic of Citizens United
militates for finding a corporate right to associate and a significant
burden on that right. But the inquiry does not end there. The Court
also overtly and drastically limited the range of government interests
against which to balance the burden. This Part will outline the
government interests that the Court previously recognized, and it will
show that Citizens United significantly narrows or discards all but
one. Before Citizens United, the Court had recognized three interests
on which the government could support contribution and expenditure
limits.
1. The Anticorruption Rationale
The anticorruption rationale is a derivative of the popular
sentiment against corporate involvement in elections that the
insurance scandals of the early twentieth century sparked.172 The
Court’s seminal decision in Buckley, of course, laid the foundation
on which the anticorruption interest would expand and, ultimately,
contract.173 In discussing contribution limits applicable to individuals,
the Buckley Court explained:

172. See EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 12 (“[The] primary purpose [of the Tillman Act of 1907]
was to destroy the influence over elections that corporations exercised through their financial
contributions.”).
173. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–30 (1976) (per curiam); Zephyr Teachout, The
Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 384 (2009) (“[Buckley] sets up the modern
framework for analyzing corruption . . . .”).
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To the extent that large contributions are given to
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential
office holders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such
pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, . . .
the problem is not an illusory one.
Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid
pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of
corruption stemming from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large
individual financial contributions.174
At least as far as Buckley is concerned, the baseline of corruption
seems to be limited to the actual or perceived existence of a quid pro
quo—“dollars for political favors.”175 But, as one scholar has argued,
the vagueness of the definition of corruption “left an important
word/concept as a big lacuna to be filled by the political philosophy
of each of the Justices.”176
Cases after Buckley bear this out. Only nine years later, for
instance, the Court described a more conceptual, less definite
baseline for corruption.177 In FEC v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee178 the Court explained that corruption is “a
subversion of the political process” to the extent that “[e]lected
officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office
by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money
into their campaigns.”179 The McConnell Court adopted this addition
and held that corruption encompasses not only Buckley’s appearance
of a quid pro quo but also the “more subtle but equally dispiriting”
appearance of undue influence.180 The McConnell Court wrote that
undue influence—the danger that office holders would decide issues
not on their merits or on the preferences of their constituents but
174. 424 U.S. at 26–27.
175. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985).
176. See Teachout, supra note 173, at 385.
177. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 497.
178. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
179. Id. at 497.
180. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143–44, 153 (2003) (stating that the Government’s
interest in combating the appearance or perception of corruption would be impeded if the Court
took away Congress’s authority to regulate the appearance of undue influence), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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instead in favor of their large donors—was as troubling as the danger
of exchanging money for favorable votes.181 Justice Kennedy
vigorously dissented on this point, saying that favoritism and
influence are unavoidable in representative politics, and that one
reason for a donor to make a contribution to a candidate is that the
candidate will respond by producing the outcomes that the donor
favors.182 “Democracy,” Justice Kennedy said, “is premised on [such]
responsiveness.”183
There is one wrinkle to the anticorruption rationale that the
Justices have agreed on: it includes an interest in avoiding
circumvention of laws that limit individual contributions.184 The
Beaumont Court recognized that “restricting contributions by various
organizations hedges against their use as conduits for ‘circumvention
of [valid] contribution limits.’”185 That is, if an individual is limited
in how much she may lawfully donate to a candidate, she could
exceed those limitations simply by forming multiple corporations
and diverting her money through them.186 At one point, all members
of the Court agreed that the anticircumvention interest is a form of
the anticorruption interest.187 Because Citizens United concerned
independent expenditures that individuals are not limited in making,
the Court did not address the anticircumvention interest. Beaumont
was the last time that the Court addressed the issue.
The Citizens United Court did discuss the anticorruption interest
generally.188 The Court circumscribed the anticorruption rationale,
largely retreading Justice Kennedy’s dissent in McConnell.189 The
Court dismissed the notion that favoritism and influence are
corruptive and held that reliance on them is at odds with standard
First Amendment analyses because they are susceptible to no

181. See id. at 153.
182. Id. at 296–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. Id. at 297.
184. E.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003).
185. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533
U.S. 431, 456 (2001)).
186. Id.
187. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 456.
188. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909–11 (2010).
189. Id. at 909–10.
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limiting principle.190 Moreover, the Court wrote that the appearance
of influence or access would not cause voters to lose faith in
American democracy.191 Instead, in spending money on advertising
in an attempt to persuade voters, makers of independent expenditures
presumed that the voters were the ultimate source of influence over
their representatives.192
Thus, Citizens United strictly limits the anticorruption rationale
to reach only the threat of actual quid pro quo corruption or the
appearance of it. Also left standing within this definition is
Beaumont’s anticircumvention interest. Together, they remain the
only government interests that a court may use to sustain the
corporate contributions ban.
2. The Shareholder-Protection Rationale
After considering the anticorruption principle, Beaumont
considered other rationales for upholding the ban, including
shareholder protection.193 As we have seen, shareholder protection is
part of the agency theory on which the Tillman Act prohibition was
originally based.194 In Beaumont, Justice Souter quoted FEC v.
National Right to Work Committee195 (NRWC) for the proposition that
the corporate contribution ban protects “the individuals who have
paid money into a corporation for purposes other than the support of
candidates”—in other words, the shareholders—“from having that
money used to support political candidates to whom they may be
opposed.”196 The NRWC Court agreed with the government’s
argument that protecting the interests of dissenting shareholders was
“sufficient to justify” the regulation.197

190. Id. at 910 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 296–97 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the
Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 596–97 (2011) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in McConnell).
191. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
192. Id.
193. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154–55 (2003).
194. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
195. 459 U.S. 197, 207–08 (1982).
196. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154 (quoting NRWC, 459 U.S. at 208). The NRWC Court did not
directly face the question of the corporate contribution ban’s validity, but it upheld a limitation on
the solicitation of a PAC’s funds to members of the Committee. See NRWC, 459 U.S. at 198.
197. NRWC, 459 U.S. at 208.

198

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:171

The shareholder-protection principle received its most robust
defense in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Austin.198 Austin,
which Citizens United overrules, considered Michigan’s ban on
corporate independent expenditures.199 The Court upheld the ban,200
with Justice Brennan joining the Court’s opinion in addition to
writing separately.201 The expenditure ban, he explained, “protects
dissenting shareholders of business corporations . . . to the extent that
such shareholders oppose the use of their money, paid as dues . . . out
of general corporate treasury funds, for political campaigns.”202
In his dissent in Austin, Justice Kennedy protested that “[t]o the
extent that members disagree with a nonprofit corporation’s policies,
they can seek change from within, withhold financial support, cease
to associate with the group, or form a rival group of their own.”203
Justice Brennan rejected this notion, writing that such measures
would impose a financial sacrifice on objectors.204 But while the state
may have no constitutional duty to protect the objecting shareholder,
the state has a compelling interest in preventing a corporation from
exploiting those shareholders who do not wish to contribute to the
corporation’s supposed political message.205 Although for the
purposes of Austin Justice Kennedy lost the argument as to the
validity of shareholder protection as a valid governmental interest,
his point of view would “in time . . . command the support of a
majority of th[e] Court.”206
As it did with the anticorruption interest, the Citizens United
majority adopted Justice Kennedy’s view.207 In overruling Austin,208
the Court held in just two paragraphs that there was little evidence
that shareholders are unable to use the shareholder voting process to
198. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 673 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
199. Id. at 655 (majority opinion).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 669–78 (Brennan, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 673.
203. Id. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 674 (Brennan, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 674–75.
206. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
207. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010).
208. Id. at 913.
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correct perceived abuses or are unable to simply sell their shares of
stock in corporations that support candidates with whom the
shareholders disagree.209 Because of the ease of opting out in some
way, it seems that Citizens United vanquishes the shareholderprotection interest in all contexts, not merely in the narrow
independent expenditure situation that the Court addressed there.
3. The Antidistortion Interest
The final traditional basis for upholding the corporate direct
contribution ban is the antidistortion rationale. Like the shareholderprotection interest, antidistortion is ultimately a concern about undue
influence.210 Unlike the anticorruption and shareholder-protection
rationales that had their origins in the scandal surrounding the 1904
election, antidistortion became a concern in the 1940s.211 In 1943
Congress passed the Smith-Connolly Act, thereby bringing labor
unions under the Tillman Act’s prohibition for the remainder of
World War II.212 In 1947, Congress made the union prohibition
permanent when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act213 “to protect the
political process from what it deemed to be the corroding effect of
money employed in elections by aggregated power.”214 However, in
Austin—a case that bore directly on corporate, not union, campaign
activity—the Court expressly applied the antidistortion rationale to
corporations.215
The Austin Court wrote of “the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”216 Corporate
wealth, in the Court’s view, had the potential to unfairly influence
209. See id. at 911.
210. Hasen, supra note 190, at 602 (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 942 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
211. United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 577–83 (1957).
212. MUTCH, supra note 22, at 153 (“Congress had banned corporation contributions after
revelations of secret business gifts to Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 reelection campaign, and it was
labor gifts to his cousin Franklin’s 1936 reelection campaign that prompted similar action against
unions.”).
213. Winkler, supra note 18, at 928.
214. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 582.
215. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
216. Id. at 660.
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elections when that wealth is deployed in the form of independent
expenditures.217 By limiting direct corporate expenditures and
requiring them to be financed through PACs funded by donations
from the corporation, its employees, and others, the Court sought to
ensure that expenditures would reflect actual public support for the
political ideas that PACs—and by extension their corporate
parents—espoused.218 The Court stressed, however, that a
corporation’s ability to accumulate large amounts of wealth was,
itself, not what justified the expenditure ban; instead, the stateconferred corporate structure that facilitated the amassing of large
treasuries warranted the limit on independent expenditures.219
As he did with respect to the shareholder-protection rationale,
Justice Kennedy vigorously disagreed with the antidistortion interest
that the majority recognized.220 He argued that
[T]here is no reason to assume that the corporate form has
an intrinsic flaw that makes it corrupt, or that all
corporations possess great wealth, or that all corporations
can buy more media coverage for their views than can
individuals or other groups. There is no reason to conclude
that independent speech by a corporation is any more likely
to dominate the political arena than speech by the wealthy
individual, . . . or by the well-funded PAC . . . .221
Once again, although he lost the battle in Austin, Justice Kennedy
would later prevail on the question of the validity of the
antidistortion interest.222
Before Justice Kennedy would have that opportunity, however,
the Court decided Beaumont. Austin, as noted above, concerned a
ban on corporate independent expenditures, not on corporate direct
campaign contributions. In Beaumont, however, the Court
recognized the antidistortion rationale in the context of the ban on
corporate direct contributions.223 The Court held that a nonprofit
217. Id.
218. Id. at 659–60.
219. Id. at 660.
220. See id. at 702 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 704–05.
222. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904–08 (2010).
223. See Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1084 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“In
Beaumont, the Court relied on Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce . . . .”).
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advocacy corporation benefitted from state-created advantages just
as its for-profit counterparts did and that the nonprofit potentially
could amass just as substantial political “war chests.”224 Justice
Kennedy, noting his dissent in Austin, concurred in Beaumont’s
judgment only.225
As it did with the shareholder-protection interest, Citizens
United essentially nullifies the antidistortion interest that the Court
had recognized for at least twenty years.226 The Court held that
antidistortion is a rationale that seeks to equalize the speech of
different speakers—a holding that is inconsistent with Buckley and
other cases.227 In what is perhaps Buckley’s most famous single
sentence, seven members of the Court agreed that “the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment . . . .”228 In contrast, Austin defended the
antidistortion rationale as a means of preventing corporations from
using vast wealth to obtain an unfair advantage in the market for
political ideas.229 The Citizens United majority emphatically rejected
this, writing that “[t]he rule that political speech cannot be limited
based on a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the
premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the
suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”230 In
the Court’s view, the antidistortion rationale is a form of viewpoint
discrimination and is thus invalid in any analysis of First
Amendment freedoms.231
In sum, Citizens United vastly undermines the interests that the
Court had traditionally used as the basis for upholding the
independent expenditure ban along with the ban on corporate direct
224. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 160 (2003).
225. Id. at 163–64 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238 (1986)).
226. See Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 257–58 (citing cases that recognized some
form of the antidistortion interest).
227. Hasen, supra note 190, at 595.
228. Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION L.J.
241, 249–50 (2003) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam)).
229. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (citing Austin v. Mich. State
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–59 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130
S. Ct. 876 (2010)).
230. Id.
231. See id. at 908.
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contributions. The Court severely circumscribed the anticorruption
interest and rejected the shareholder-protection and antidistortion
interests with such force that their future use is doubtful. With those
interests on the ash heap of jurisprudential history, only the narrowed
anticorruption interest and the anticircumvention interest remained as
bases for upholding campaign finance regulations—the corporate
direct contribution ban among them.
IV. THE CITIZENS UNITED FRAMEWORK
MILITATES AGAINST THE
CORPORATE DIRECT CONTRIBUTION BAN
Citizens United creates a new framework in which to analyze
corporate First Amendment rights. First, the case limits the rationales
that are available to the government in arguing that the Court should
uphold the corporate campaign contribution limitation, making it
probable that the Justices will be more skeptical of the ban when a
party contests its constitutionality before the Court. Second, the
Court recognized that a corporation has an original speech right,
making it clear that corporations have the full benefits of the
derivative-association right. Third, Citizens United marks a shift in
perspective on whose right is being burdened by regulations on
corporate involvement in campaign funding—making it more likely
that the Court will find the contribution ban to be a significant
burden on corporations themselves, rather than on corporate
shareholders or on hearers of the corporate message. To stay
logically consistent with this new framework, the Court should
overrule the weakened Beaumont precedent that upholds the
corporate contributions ban. The following analysis explains why.
A. The Level of Scrutiny
Because the Citizens United Court did not confront the question
of direct contributions, it did not have the opportunity to alter the
level of scrutiny to which it would subject the corporate ban. In
Buckley, the Court applied the “closely drawn” level of scrutiny.232
At this level, a regulation that involves a significant burden on
association rights will be upheld “if the State demonstrates a
232. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam); see FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S.
146, 162 (2003).
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sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”233
Closely drawn scrutiny is thus less probing than strict scrutiny is, but
it is greater than simple rational basis review is. Although some
members of the Court have argued that strict scrutiny ought to apply
in all cases that involve political speech, including those involving
contribution limits,234 the oracular nature of Buckley’s position in
campaign-finance cases means that the Court is unlikely to change
course. The totality of the ban, however, means that the closely
drawn standard will be sufficient for the Court to use to strike down
the ban.
B. The Corporate Contributions Ban Severely
Burdens Corporate Associational Rights
The burden that the ban places on corporations’ associational
rights is severe. In Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield,235 a case
concerning a state law that banned individuals registered as lobbyists
from making donations to political candidates,236 the Second Circuit
explained that where a law imposes contribution bans on discrete
groups, the ban “utterly eliminates [that group’s] right to express
[its] support for a candidate by contributing money to the candidate’s
cause.”237 Quoting Buckley, the court wrote that a contribution ban
“cuts off even ‘the symbolic expression of support evidenced by’ a
small contribution”238 that a contributions limit would allow.
Moreover, none of this is alleviated by the corporation’s ability to
divert its donations though a PAC, since Citizens United shows that
the corporation’s rights are not the same as—and thus are not
affected by—the PAC’s rights. To that end, a general ban on
corporate direct campaign contributions, like the ban in Green Party,
not only significantly burdens the corporate right to associate but

233. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
234. E.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 640 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (writing that there is no
constitutionally significant distinction between contributions and expenditures, and that strict
scrutiny should be applied to limits on both).
235. 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010).
236. Id. at 192.
237. Id. at 201, 206.
238. Id. at 206 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21).
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extinguishes its exercise entirely. The ban allows for not even the
slightest symbolic donation.
C. The Remaining Interests Are Important, but
the Law Is Inadequately Tailored
Against this significant burden the Court has only the
circumscribed anticorruption interest, along with its included
anticircumvention interest, to weigh. Moreover, the Green Party
court quoted Buckley to hold that if the state’s interest could be
achieved by the means of a limit—as opposed to a ban—“the ban
should be struck down for failing ‘to avoid unnecessary abridgement
of associational freedoms.’”239 In other words, the ban should be
struck down because it is poorly tailored.
As to anticorruption, the ban is poorly tailored, indeed, since a
law could satisfy anticorruption concerns simply by subjecting
corporations to the individual limit rather than by banning corporate
donations altogether. As described above, Citizens United dismisses
any distinction between individual and corporate speech rights in the
political context. Laws must therefore avoid unnecessarily burdening
a corporation’s associational freedoms in the same way that they
must avoid burdening the associational freedoms of individuals. An
outright ban on corporate donations leaves corporations unable to
exercise their associational freedoms in even a symbolic way, let
alone in the limited way in which an individual may exercise her
coextensive rights. Subjecting corporations to individual limits
would satisfy anticorruption concerns in the same way that the
individual limitations do. The complete ban on corporate direct
contributions is simply not necessary to achieve the narrow
anticorruption interest that remains after Citizens United.
Additionally, it is unclear whether the anticircumvention interest
is adequate on its own where the anticorruption rationale is not
sufficiently tailored. The anticircumvention interest has, alone, never
served as a sufficiently important rationale for upholding the
corporate ban.240 Even if it were sufficiently important on its own, the
ban is still inadequately tailored. As one court recently recognized,
other means of preventing the fraudulent circumvention of valid
239. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
240. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003).
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limits exist in the form of laws that make it illegal for one person to
make a contribution in the name of another person.241 The ban is
therefore not the least restrictive means to satisfy any circumvention
concerns, and it is therefore poorly tailored.
By banishing the shareholder-protection and anticircumvention
interests and limiting the anticorruption interest, Citizens United
removes two legs of the three-legged stool upon which the
contributions ban has rested. Moreover—and more important—by
equating corporate speech rights with individual speech rights,
Citizens United makes the tailoring of the ban far too loose.
Beaumont theoretically remains good law, but the Court decided it at
a time when the Court viewed corporate speech rights as derivative
of the original rights that listeners and shareholders hold. Citizens
United makes it clear that this framework is inappropriate under the
First Amendment because the corporate right is original, not
derivative, and because restrictions based on the corporate identity of
the speaker are unconstitutional. To remain consistent with this
framework, the Court should overrule Beaumont because within the
framework a ban on corporate contributions is unconstitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Citizens United does not address the question of the
constitutionality of the corporate direct contribution ban, it makes
important and far-reaching changes to the doctrine that a future
Supreme Court will use if the ban comes before it again. If that
happens—and several cases are under way trying to ensure that it
does242—to remain consistent with Citizens United, the Court should
find the ban unconstitutional.
Citizens United recognizes corporate original speech rights, and
thereby ensures that corporations have a freedom to associate with a
candidate via a campaign contribution in the same way that an
individual does. Although the anticorruption and anticircumvention
interests remain, the ban is poorly tailored to account for the
241. United States v. Danielczyk, No. 1:11cr-85 JCC, 2011 WL 2268063, at *4 (E.D. Va.
June 7, 2011) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441f (2006)). The court also recognized that 18 U.S.C. § 1001
makes it illegal to make false statements or representations to the government, as would occur if
someone diverted her own contributions through a corporation. Id.
242. Thalmheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding the ban);
Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding the
ban).
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corporate original speech right that Citizens United recognizes.
Under the Citizens United framework, the century-old corporate
direct contributions ban is unconstitutional.
President Obama’s controversial statements in his 2010 State of
the Union address reflected a general apprehension over Citizens
United among those who believe in the benefits of campaign finance
reform.243 The concerns are probably motivated by the same concerns
that motivated President Roosevelt and others to advocate for the ban
in the early 1900s. But all need not be lost. Soon after Citizens
United, the retailer Target gave $150,000 toward the election of a
Minnesota gubernatorial candidate.244 Although Citizens United had
nothing to do with that state-level donation, the increased public
engagement on corporate campaign finance issues post-Citizens
United made the donation a minor scandal.245 Target’s contribution
provoked anger from shareholders and a threat of a boycott from
consumers, and Target later apologized for the donation and changed
its political donation policy.246 For those who are concerned about
money in politics, the upshot of Citizens United may be that it will
spark renewed vigilance among the voting public.

243. See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. John McCain, Statement by Senator John McCain in
Response to the Supreme Court’s Decision in Citizens United v. FEC (Jan. 21 2010), available at
http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentReco
rd_id=011b4f81-ecaa-33b0-dc61-32bd9f81b631&Region_id=&Issue_id=15a904d0-1277-40f2843d-904f077cb0fb; Richard L. Hasen, Money Grubbers: The Supreme Court Kills Campaign
Finance Reform, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2010, 12:58 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2242209/.
244. Kim Geiger & Noam N. Levey, Target Changes Political Donations Policy After
Controversy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2011, at 22, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/
19/nation/la-na-target-20110219.
245. See id.
246. Id.

